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People generally tend to advance gains and postpone losses in intertemporal choice.
Jiang et al. (2014) recently showed that adding upfront losses or gains to both smaller
and sooner (SS) and larger and later (LL) rewards can decrease people’s discounting.
To account for this decrease, they proposed the salience hypothesis, which states that
introducing upfront losses or gains makes the money dimension more salient than
not, thus increasing people’s preference for LL rewards. Considering that decreasing
the discounting of delayed losses is imperative and that most previous studies have
focused on intertemporal choices with gains, in the current paper we conducted two
experiments and used hypothetical money outcomes to examine whether the effect
of upfront money could be extended to intertemporal choices with losses. The results
showed that when both SS and LL intertemporal losses were combined with an upfront
loss or gain, people’s discounting rate decreased and the preference for the SS option
increased. This finding further supports the salience account.
Keywords: intertemporal choice with losses, intertemporal choice with gains, upfront money effect, discounting
rate, salience account
INTRODUCTION
We must frequently make trade-offs in daily decisions between consequences occurring at different
points in time, for example, taking a job now vs. receiving a higher education and having a chance
at a better job later or buying luxury goods now vs. saving money for retirement. To study such
intertemporal choices, researchers typically ask participants to choose between smaller and sooner
(SS) and larger and later (LL) rewards (e.g., gaining CNY 3500 in a year vs. gaining CNY 5800 in
3 years). People usually show steep discounting and prefer SS rewards to LL rewards (Frederick
et al., 2002; Takahashi, 2005; Estle et al., 2007). Steep discounting of delayed rewards can disrupt
the achievement of long-term goals, such as insufficient saving for retirement (Figner et al., 2010;
Findley and Caliendo, 2014).
Temporal discounting also occurs in the domain of losses, leading people to postpone the losses
until later, although laboratory studies typically find a tendency to discount gains more steeply
than losses (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988; Frederick et al., 2002; Hardisty and Weber, 2009).
Actually, many personal and social issues, such as substance abuse, ecological destruction, excessive
borrowing, climate change, among others, are products of discounting delayed gains as well as
losses. For example, substance abuse appears frequently in people who relatively focus too much
on current pleasures while remaining insensitive to delayed health losses (Myerson et al., 2016).
Decreasing the discounting of delayed losses is thus as imperative as that of delayed gains among
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both individuals and groups. However, most previous studies
have focused on how to reduce people’s discounting in
intertemporal choices with gains rather than losses. For example,
Read et al. (2005) found that framing delays (for example, in
3 months) as dates (for example, on the 1st of October) can
make participants more likely to choose LL rewards; Magen
et al. (2008) showed that explicitly stating the default outcomes
associated with each option (for example, gaining CNY 3500 in
a year and CNY 0 in 3 years vs. gaining CNY 0 in a year and
CNY 5800 in 3 years) leads participants to choose LL rewards
more frequently. Jiang et al. (2014) recently introduced a new
way to decrease people’s discounting to delayed rewards, that
is, by adding upfront losses as well as gains1 to both SS and
LL rewards. For example, if an immediate loss or gain of CNY
160 was added to a pairwise choice of “gaining CNY 3500 in
a year vs. gaining CNY 5800 in 3 years,” the preference for the
LL option (i.e., losing/gaining CNY 160 immediately and gaining
CNY 5800 in 3 years) over the SS option (i.e., losing/gaining CNY
160 immediately and gaining CNY 3500 in a year) increased.
According to their saliency account, the introduction of upfront
money to the SS and LL rewards would enhance the salience of
the money dimension and make people assign a greater decision
weight to the money dimension. An increased preference for the
LL rewards was then detected.
Because there is little important research that examines how to
decrease the discounting rate in intertemporal losses compared
with intertemporal gains, we investigated in this paper whether
the upfront money effect can be extended to the loss domain.
Based on the salience account, we assumed that introducing
upfront money might make the money dimension more salient
and cause people to focus more on the money, therefore
increasing people’s preference for the SS options (i.e., the options
losing less) in pairwise intertemporal losses. We conducted
two experiments to test this assumption. Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 examined whether introducing upfront gains and
losses, respectively, to the SS and LL losses could reduce people’s
discounting and thus increase the preference for SS options.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
In Experiment 1, 181 undergraduates (77 males, two did
not report their genders, Mage = 19.75, SD = 0.93) from
1The upfront gain effect was first reported by Urminsky and Kivetz (2011).
Zhejiang University of Technology participated in a class for
course credit. This study was carried out in accordance with
the recommendations of Shanghai Normal University ethical
guidelines and the Declaration of Helsinki, with written informed
consent from all participants.
Each of the participants was randomly assigned one of two of
the following conditions: participants in the pure loss condition
responded to simple choice pairs (e.g., losing CNY 210 in a week
vs. losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks), whereas those in the upfront
money condition had the same choices, except that both the SS
and LL options were introduced with the same upfront gains
(e.g., gaining CNY 11 now and losing CNY 210 in a week vs.
gaining CNY 11 now and losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks). The
money outcomes in this experiment were hypothetical (see the
Appendix 1).
To assess whether the results were maintained for different
losses, each participant in the pure loss condition indicated his
or her preferences for two pairwise choices, between which the
losses were varied [i.e., Choice 1: losing CNY 210 in a week vs.
losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks, Choice 2: losing CNY 3500 in a
year vs. losing CNY 5800 in 3 years; these two pairwise choices
were both adapted from Experiment 1A in Jiang et al. (2014)]
[the loss amounts in Choice 2 are larger than those in Choice 1
while the delays in Choice 2 are longer than those in Choice 1,
therefore the two attributes (loss amount and delay length) are
correlated2]. Correspondingly, the participants in the upfront
money condition also completed two pairwise choices (Table 1).
Each participant indicated his or her preferences for two
pairwise choices in a questionnaire, which was presented with
other unrelated questions on paper. The order of the two pairwise
choices was counterbalanced.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Table 1, for Choice 1, 46.2% of participants chose
the SS option in the pure loss condition, whereas in the upfront
money condition, 61.6% participants preferred the SS option.
For Choice 2, 48.4% of participants chose the SS option in the
pure loss condition, whereas 68.9% participants preferred the
SS option in the upfront money condition. A random intercept
model was fitted using the Stata 11 command “xtlogit,” with
choice as dependent variable, and upfront money, loss amount,
and upfront money × loss amount as independent variables3.
2Thanks to the reviewer for pointing it out.
3Thanks to the reviewer for suggesting using this method.
TABLE 1 | Questionnaire items and summary of the choice results for Experiment 1.
Choice Item (proportion of responses, 95% confidence interval) (%) The difference between the
proportions of choosing SS options
(95% confidence interval) (%)Pure loss condition Upfront money condition
1 Losing CNY 210 in a week (46.2,
36.3–56.3) vs. losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks
(53.8, 43.7–63.7)
Gaining CNY 11 now and losing CNY 210 in a week (61.1,
43.4–72.9) vs. gaining CNY 11 now and losing CNY 250 in
5 weeks (38.9, 50.8–70.5)
15.0 (0.5–28.6)
2 Losing CNY 3500 in a year (48.4,
38.4–58.5) vs. losing CNY 5800 in 3 years
(51.6, 41.5–61.6)
Gaining CNY 160 now and losing CNY 3500 in a year (68.9,
58.7–77.5) vs. gaining CNY 160 now and losing CNY 5800
in 3 years (31.1, 22.5–41.3)
20.5 (6.2–33.7)
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The results showed that adding upfront money or not had a
significant and negative effect on the preference, coef. = −0.93,
z = −1.97, p = 0.048, 95% CI (−1.86, −0.01). The loss amount
(or the delay length) did not have a significant effect on the
preference, coef. = −0.13, z = −0.37, p = 0.71, 95% CI (−0.86,
0.59). There was no interaction between the adding money and
the loss amount (or the delay length), coef. = −0.39, z = −0.73,
p = 0.47, 95% CI (−1.44, 0.66). The regression model can be
summarized as follows:
Y = 0.24− 0.93UFM− 0.13LA− 0.39UFM× LA
(Y represents choice, UFM represents upfront money, LA
represents loss amount)
These results suggested that the introduction of upfront gains
to both the SS and LL losses significantly reduced people’s
discounting and increased the preference for SS losses (from
46.2% to 61.1% in Choice 1; from 48.4% to 68.9% in Choice 2).
The effect remained unchanged regardless of whether the losses
were small or large (or the delays were short or long). The findings
further supported the salience account that adding upfront gains
makes the money dimension more salient and leads participants
to prefer SS losses more.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we introduced upfront losses, instead of gains,
to both the SS and LL losses to examine whether the effects of
upfront losses could also be extended to intertemporal choices
involving losses.
Methods
A total of 195 undergraduates (80 males, one did not report
their gender, Mage = 20.84, SD = 2.04) from Zhejiang
University of Technology participated in this experiment. The
data were collected in the library’s study room. This study
was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of Shanghai Normal University ethical guidelines and the
Declaration of Helsinki, with written informed consent from all
participants.
Each of the participants was randomly assigned to one of
two of the following conditions: in the pure loss condition,
participants responded to typical choice pairs as in Experiment
1, whereas those in the upfront money condition had the same
choices except that both of the SS and LL losses were combined
with upfront losses. As in Experiment 1, the money outcomes in
this experiment were also hypothetical (see the Appendix 1).
In the upfront money condition, we adopted the logic behind
choice stimuli design in Experiments 1B, 2B, and 2C of Jiang
et al. (2014). That is, the losses added to SS losses were slightly
larger than those added to LL losses (e.g., losing CNY 16 now
and losing CNY 210 in a week vs. losing CNY 11 now and
losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks), thus making the prospects of
SS losses relative to LL losses in the upfront money condition
were worse than the prospects of SS losses relative to LL losses
in the pure loss condition. Therefore, the SS losses should be
less popular in the former condition than those in the latter
condition.
To assess whether the results were maintained for different
losses, each participant in the pure loss condition indicated
his or her preferences for two pairwise choices, between which
the losses were varied (i.e., Choice 1: losing CNY 210 in a
week vs. losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks, Choice 2: losing CNY
3500 in a year vs. losing CNY 5800 in 3 years; the loss
amount and the delay length are correlated in the same way
as in Experiment 1). Correspondingly, the participants in the
upfront money condition also completed two pairwise choices
(Table 2).
Each participant indicated his or her preferences for two
pairwise choices in the questionnaire, which was presented
with other unrelated questions on paper. The order of the two
pairwise choices in each condition was counterbalanced. After
completion, each participant received a small gift.
Results and Discussion
As Table 2 illustrates, for Choice 1, 33.3% of participants chose
the SS option in the pure loss condition, whereas in the upfront
money condition, 54.2% participants preferred the SS option.
For Choice 2, 50.5% of participants chose the SS option in
the pure loss condition, whereas 65.6% participants preferred
the SS option in the upfront money condition. As the same as
Experiment 1, we used the Stata 11 command “xtlogit” to fit
a random intercept model, with choice as dependent variable,
and upfront money, loss amount, and upfront money × loss
amount as independent variables. The results showed that adding
upfront money or not had a significant and negative effect on
the preference, coef. = −1.15, z = −2.83, p = 0.005, 95% CI
(−1.95, −0.35). The loss amount (or the delay length) also had a
significant and negative effect on the preference, coef. = −0.95,
z = −2.72, p = 0.007, 95% CI (−1.64, −0.27). No interaction
TABLE 2 | Questionnaire items and summary of the choice results for Experiment 2.
Choice Item (proportion of responses, 95% confidence interval) (%) The difference between the
proportions of choosing SS options
(95% confidence interval) (%)Pure loss condition Upfront money condition
1 Losing CNY 210 in a week (33.3,
24.8–43.1) vs. losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks
(66.7, 56.9–75.2)
Losing CNY 16 now and losing CNY 210 in a week (54.2,
44.2–63.8) vs. losing CNY 11 now and losing CNY 250 in
5 weeks (45.8, 36.2–55.8)
20.8 (6.9–33.7)
2 Losing CNY 3500 in a year (50.5,
40.8–60.2) vs. losing CNY 5800 in 3 years
(49.5, 39.9–59.2)
Losing CNY 165 now and losing CNY 3500 in a year (65.6,
55.7–74.4) vs. losing CNY 160 now and losing CNY 5800
in 3 years (34.4, 25.6–44.3)
15.1 (1.3–28.2)
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was detected between the adding money and the loss amount
(or the delay length), coef. = 0.32, z = 0.65, p = 0.513, 95%
CI (−0.63, 1.26). The regression model can be summarized as
follows:
Y = 0.93− 1.15UFM− 0.95LA+ 0.32UFM× LA
(Y represents choice, UFM represents upfront money, LA
represents loss amount)
These results suggested that the introduction of upfront losses
to both intertemporal options significantly reduced people’s
discounting and increased the preference for SS losses (from
33.3% to 54.2% in Choice 1; from 50.5% to 65.6% in Choice 2)
even though the prospects of SS losses relative to LL losses in
the upfront money condition were worse than the prospects of SS
losses relative to LL losses in the pure loss condition. This effect
was maintained across different loss sizes. These observations
were consistent with the prediction of the salience hypothesis
that the effects of upfront losses in intertemporal choices with
rewards also can be extended to intertemporal choices with losses.
Compared with Experiment 1, we found an extra significant and
negative effect of loss amount (or delay length) on the preference,
which showed an increased preference for SS losses when the
losses in intertemporal choice were small (or delay lengths were
shorter). However, because we are not interested in the effects of
loss amount (or delay length) on intertemporal choice and we did
not strictly manipulate the loss amounts (or the delay lengths), we
did not discuss this here.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Based on the upfront money effect found in intertemporal
choices with rewards (Jiang et al., 2014), this paper shows
that this effect also extends to intertemporal choices with
losses. When upfront losses or gains were added to SS and
LL intertemporal losses, people’s discounting rate decreased and
the preference for the SS option increased. Laboratory studies
of intertemporal choice typically find that the desire to have
good things immediately is much stronger than the desire to
postpone negative outcomes (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988;
Frederick et al., 2002; Hardisty and Weber, 2009). Xu et al. (2009)
found that the discounting of future losses and the discounting
of gains occurs asymmetrically in the brain. Comparing our
findings with the results in Jiang et al. (2014), asymmetry in
discounting could also be detected. For example, in the choice
between losing CNY 210 in a week vs. losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks
(choice 1, Experiment 1), only 53.8% of participants chose the
delayed loss. Whereas when the choice remained unchanged,
except that losses were substituted with rewards, 87.5% of
participants chose the early rewards (choice 2, Experiment 1A,
Jiang et al., 2014). However, despite the asymmetric gain/loss
discounting, the upfront money effect of intertemporal choice
with gains can also be extended to intertemporal choice with
losses.
Based on the upfront money effect found by Jiang et al.
(2014), Sun and Jiang (2015) further hypothesized that, if the
salience account was right, the effect of discounting decreasing
could be extended to adding dated-money between SS and
LL rewards and after LL rewards, because introducing dated
money between the SS and LL rewards or after the LL rewards
may also make the money dimension more salient and, thus,
decrease people’s discounting. Sun and Jiang confirmed their
hypothesis. Therefore, to further examine the salience account
and to examine whether all types of extra money effects (not
only upfront money effect) could be extended to the loss domain,
we examined whether the effects in Sun and Jiang could be
extended to the intertemporal choice in loss domain. Each of 500
participants was randomly assigned one of five conditions and
were offered one set of options: the pure loss condition, “Losing
CNY 210 in a week (53.0%— the percentage of participants who
chose this option) vs. Losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks (47.0%)”;
the intervening gain condition, “Losing CNY 210 in a week
and gaining CNY 11 in 3 weeks (83.0%) vs. Gaining CNY
11 in 3 weeks and Losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks (17.0%)”; the
intervening loss condition, “Losing CNY 210 in a week and
losing CNY 11 in 3 weeks (67.7%) vs. Losing CNY 11 in
3 weeks and Losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks (32.3%)”; the later
gain condition, “Losing CNY 210 in a week and gaining CNY
11 in 6 weeks (62.6%) vs. Losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks and
gaining CNY 11 in 6 weeks (37.4%)”; the later loss condition,
“Losing CNY 210 in a week and losing CNY 11 in 6 weeks
(72.9%) vs. Losing CNY 250 in 5 weeks and losing CNY 11 in
6 weeks (27.1%).” The results showed that the introduction of an
intervening loss/gain or a later loss/gain to both intertemporal
losses statistically significantly (all ps < 0.05, except the later
gain condition, p = 0.17) increase the participants’ preferences
for SS option and reduced people’s discounting, suggesting that
the intervening money effect and the later money effect could
also be extended to the intertemporal choice in loss domain.
The upfront money effect, the intervening money effect and the
later money effect in the loss domain in this study, together with
these effects in the gain domain in Jiang et al. (2014) and in
Sun and Jiang (2015) support the salience account, which states
that introducing extra money to pairwise intertemporal options
makes the money dimension more salient and thus decreases
discounting.
Several possible explanations have been excluded to explain
the extra money effects until now, i.e., the normative exponential
and descriptive hyperbolic discounting models which agree on
the independence and additive assumptions; the integration
hypothesis which assumes that decision makers integrate upfront
money with final money and make a decision with a bottom
line at the end (Jiang et al., 2014), the time scale hypothesis
which assumes that the presentation of the 0-delay amount
anchors the time dimension at 0 rather than the delivered time
of the SS outcomes may make the delay between the LL and
SS outcomes appear shorter than when the upfront money is
not introduced, and the preference for improvement account
that assumes decision makers like outcomes to improve rather
than worsen over time (Sun and Jiang, 2015). Although the
salience account is consistent with all the current findings about
the extra money effects, it does not mean that there are not
any other possible accounts that could explain the effects as
well. For example, the extra money effects may reflect the
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sensitivity of relative value of money outcome to contextual
changes (Engelmann and Hein, 2013), that is, adding the
extra small money made comparison of the value of money
outcome between SS and LL options larger than when the extra
money is not introduced, thus increased people’s preference
for the option with a greater value (LL options in choices
between intertemporal gains and SS options in choices between
intertemporal losses). Further studies are required to fully
examine the salience account and to explore other possible
explanations.
Previous studies used hypothetical outcomes to explore the
extra money effects (Jiang et al., 2014; Sun and Jiang, 2015). In the
current study, we also asked the participants to choose between
hypothetical money outcomes, rather than delivering the actual
money outcomes, because executing real losses (e.g., CNY 3500)
with the participants was impossible. Although it was found that
using hypothetical intertemporal money outcomes yield the same
results as using actual money outcomes (Johnson and Bickel,
2002; Madden et al., 2004; Bickel et al., 2009), future studies
were required to test the extra money effects with actual money
outcomes.
Every day we make decisions that involve trade-offs between
short-term and long-term consequences that include gains and
positive events as well as losses and negative events across
single-dated outcomes as well as multiple-dated outcomes.
However, most previous studies focus on intertemporal choices
with gains and with single-dated outcomes (e.g., Green and
Myerson, 2004; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Wittmann et al.,
2007). This paper may shed some light on the underlying
mechanism of intertemporal choices with losses and multiple-
dated outcomes and provide some insight into a way to reduce
people’s discounting of delayed losses.
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